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Abstract—In the past few years, Internet of Things (IoT)
devices have emerged and spread everywhere. Many researchers
have been motivated to study the security issues of IoT devices
due to the sensitive information they carry about their owners.
Privacy is not simply about encryption and access authorization,
but also about what kind of information is transmitted, how it
used and to whom it will be shared with. Thus, IoT manufacturers
should be compelled to issue Privacy Policy Agreements for their
respective devices as well as ensure that the actual behavior
of the IoT device complies with the issued privacy policy. In
this paper, we implement a test bed for ensuring compliance of
Internet of Things data disclosure to the corresponding privacy
policy. The fundamental approach used in the test bed is to
capture the data trafﬁc between the IoT device and the cloud,
between the IoT device and its application on the smart-phone,
and between the IoT application and the cloud and analyze those
packets for various features. We test 11 IoT manufacturers and
the results reveal that half of those IoT manufacturers do not
have an adequate privacy policy speciﬁcally for their IoT devices.
In addition, we prove that the action of two IoT devices does not
comply with what they stated in their privacy policy agreement.
Index Terms—IoT privacy policy; IoT policy; policy test bed;
IoT privacy policy agreement; Compliance; GDPR
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a multi-domain (physical
and digital) environment. It is made up of multiple services
and devices, which are linked up and used to gather and
exchange data. Objects are connected to the Internet, so that
they can produce and share information. While there are
numerous beneﬁts to this, the issue of security continues to be
a big challenge [1]. According to most analysts, the massive
growth of IoT devices is inevitable in the future. It has so
far been estimated by Gartner that 4.9 billion devices will
be connected as of 2015 increasing to 25 billion by the year
2020. Cisco’s IoT group forecasts that, by 2020, the number of
connected devices will be more than 50 billion. IoT wearable
devices are predicted to reach a total of 45.7 million by 2015
and 126.1 million units in 2019 according to IDC, which
will result in a ﬁve-year compound annual growth rate of
45.1% [2], [3]. The diversity of IoT application domains is
obvious, covering many aspects like smart cities, building and
home automation, logistics and transportation, environmental
monitoring to smart enterprise environments etc. and other
smart wearable devices [4]. However, data security and privacy
are the primary obstacles to the widespread application of the
IoT applications. Certainly, the fear that sensitive information
will be lost or exposed is one of the main reasons why so
many people still avoid this kind of technology. Thus, it is
fair to say that data security is a key factor in determining
the efﬁciency and viability of the IoT [5]. Yet, the majority
of IoT users do not understand what kind of information
is being collected about them or their environment. In fact,
a signiﬁcant proportion of users are not fully aware that
they are sharing information in the ﬁrst place [6]. Privacy is
not only about access authorization and encryption; rather, it
also emphasizes on the type of transmitted information [7],
and on how it will be used and shared by the legitimate
recipient (e.g. IoT manufacturer). To tackle IoT privacy issues,
governments along with industry stakeholders have established
several regulations and policies to standardize and ensure IoT
privacy such as the following: Before using an IoT-connected
device, users must be fully informed in a Privacy Policy
Agreement (PPA) of the ways in which their data will be used,
and they must give their consent to these terms [8]. However, it
is important for IoT manufacturers not only to have a sufﬁcient
PPA for their respective devices, but also to comply with what
they state in their PPA.
To the best of our knowledge, most academic research
focuses only on IoT attacks and violations. So, we are the ﬁrst
who highlight the importance of enforcing IoT manufacturers
to issue a sufﬁcient PPA as well as monitor the behavior of
such IoT devices. Therefore, this study focuses on identifying
to what extent those devices comply with their issued PPA.
Our main contributions are the following:
1) We provide a theoretical overview of issues around IoT
privacy and why there is an urgent need to update the
IoT privacy law.
2) We focus on the language used within data privacy
policies and, by merging and analyzing the existing
privacy principles, we systematize them into 8 data
privacy criteria. We argue that each IoT manufacturer
should adhere to those criteria when they issue their
privacy policy for their respective IoT device.
3) We design and implement a practical test bed for eval-
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uating the level of compliance of the Internet of Things
data disclosure with their privacy policy.
4) We use this test bed to evaluate the compliance of the
actual behavior of 2 IoT devices with their PPA and with
the 8 criteria, and present our conclusions which prove
that the 2 IoT devices do not fully comply to what they
state in their PPA.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2
we discuss the related work. We identify the terms of PPA and
why it is important for IoT devices as well as we discusses
some differences between website PPAs and IoT PPAs in
section 3, while in section 4 we discuss our proposed model
including the main 8 privacy criteria that should be applied to
any IoT device; we apply those 8 criteria to 11 IoT devices;
and we analyze the adherence of those IoT devices to the
mentioned 8 criteria. Also, our test bed design and results is
explained in detail in this section. The conclusion is presented
in Section 5.
II. RELATED WORK
Existing research has focused on analyzing IoT devices
in terms of their security and privacy issues in order to
discover any security vulnerabilities. The foremost intended
contribution of this paper is to clarify and emphasize on
the problem of IoT compliance with the device’s privacy
policy, which has not been in focus in the ﬁeld of IoT
devices. In this section, we examine the available IoT literature
focusing on IoT security and privacy test bed as well as
different attacks and vulnerabilities targeting various types
of IoT devices related to user data disclosure. We see that
the literature is limited to unauthorized access to personal
data (e.g. anticipating the users behavioral pattern by snifﬁng
wireless trafﬁc exclusively), while no attention has been given
to risks and vulnerabilities related to the type of personal
information being collected from IoT devices, nor to the level
of compliance to the corresponding privacy policy agreement.
A state-of-the-art test bed for wearable IoT devices was
proposed by Siboni et al. [9]. Its main goal is to apply a set
of security requirements against wearable IoT devices in order
to test their security level. Also, it tests the behavior of these
wearable IoT devices under several conditions, for example
when different applications are running.
Wang et al. [10] present a contextual attack system called
MoLe (Motion Leaks through Smart watch Sensors) using a
smart watch device. They ﬁnd that it is possible to recognize
and identify the words typed with reasonable accuracy, thus
violating user privacy.
Tekeoglu and Tosun [11] ﬁnd security and privacy issues of
the NetCam device, as it does not encrypt the images sent to
the cloud. In addition, encrypted trafﬁc can be decrypted with
little effort.
In our study, we use the same Netcam device and we
conﬁrm the ﬁndings by Tekeoglu and Tosun. However, we
use a different a test bed model, and our intention in collecting
data trafﬁc is to prove the level of compliance between what
the NetCam sends and what is stated in their PPA.
A system called IoTScanner, which analyzes an IoT envi-
ronment, has been proposed by Siby et al. [12]. This system
can scan trafﬁc in the Wi-Fi, Zigbee, and Bluetooth Low
Energy frequencies. It also gives an overview of IoT devices
that are currently active in a particular environment as well
as the communication taking place between them. They ﬁnd
that it is possible to violate user privacy by classifying Wi-Fi
enabled devices in an active environment based on the ratio
analysis of sent-to-received trafﬁc.
Torre et al. [13] discover a new kind of privacy risk related
to personal data leakage when users share their data with third
parties while using IoT applications. They deﬁne a number of
algorithms in order to conduct inference attacks as well as
offer strategies to avoid such attacks. An Adaptive Inference
Discovery Service has been proposed by them which helps
users conﬁgure their permissions to share personal data and
to allow them to identify any risks related to this shared
information. Notice that the proposed system works as an
add-on to personal data managers PDMs as a recommended
system.
Cyr et al. [14] applied a comprehensive security test on
the Fitbit Flex ﬁtness device which is a popular tracker
device. They mainly examine the Bluetooth connection be-
tween the tracker device and its paired Android smartphone
device, which includes the Fitbit application. They analyze
the communication between the Fitbit application and its web
service. Interestingly, they ﬁnd that sensitive information such
as the BLE credential is sent in plaintext from the Fitbit
web server to the smartphone application. This means that
any attacker could obtain this information with a Man-in-
the-Middle-Aattack (MITM). Also, they point out that smart-
phones could eavesdrop on any close Fitbit devices and send
their MAC addresses to the Fitbit server; notice that these
security issues will allow anyone to track other Fitbit users.
III. PRIVACY POLICY AGREEMENT DEFINITION AND ITS
IMPORTANCE FOR IOT DEVICES
According to the Internet Security Glossary [15], data
privacy is described as “the right of an entity (normally a
person), acting in its own behalf, to determine the degree
to which it will interact with its environment, including the
degree to which the entity is willing to share information about
itself with others” [16]. The purpose of a privacy policy is
to inform users about the type of information that will be
captured, why it is being collected, and what will be done to
prevent this process from becoming detrimental to the user.
The problem is that many people still do not read privacy
policies. Nowadays, most governments do treat data privacy
as an essential human right [17]. It is now the norm for
businesses to be obligated to state precisely why they want the
information and what they plan to do with it [18]. However,
existing privacy laws and regulations are not focused on IoT
devices speciﬁcally. We argue that they are insufﬁcient to
capture important differences between general data protection
scenarios and IoT-speciﬁc scenarios. In this study, we explain
why it is important to have a separate PPA for IoT devices:
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1) IoT devices are being manufactured for close, personal
use. For example, a smart watch could be worn for
most of the day, which would collect a huge amount of
information about the personal habits and behavior of the
wearer [9], [19]. Therefore, the user has the right to have
a prior knowledge of what kind of sensitive information
is being transmitted.
2) The ﬁnancial value of IoT users’ data is connected to
the ability of this data to help manufacturers sell more
products (e.g by knowing the user behavior, or the user
preferences). It could be argued that IoT manufacturers
have a vested interest in collecting user data without
informing users about it [9]. In this scenario, to prevent
IoT manufacturer from using user’s data for their inter-
est, they should issue a sufﬁcient PPA and comply with
it.
Therefore, consumers need to be made aware in advance
that their information is not completely secure and private.
They should also know that outside entities may be able
to eavesdrop on their information. This prior knowledge is
typically encoded in a PPA, and it covers the whole data
lifecycle, from the exact point in time when data packets are
captured by the IoT device’s sensors until the phase where
raw data is effectively deleted, speciﬁcally for sensitive data
gathering devices [6]. According to the EU Commission report
on the IoT [20], privacy and security continue to be the biggest
challenge for IoT research that contains privacy-preserving
technology for heterogeneous device sets. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) [21] agrees with this statement. The head
of the FTC, Edith Ramirez, mentioned that “The only way for
the Internet of Things to reach its full potential for innovation
is with the trust of American Consumers. We believe that by
adopting the best practices we have laid out, businesses will
be better able to provide consumers the protections they want
and allow the beneﬁts of the Internet of things to be fully
realized.”
A study by the Information Commissioner’s Ofﬁce (ICO)
[18] reveals that six in ten IoT devices do not come with
sufﬁciently comprehensive privacy agreements. These agree-
ments fail to fully explain why and how personal data is
utilized by IoT devices. The study reveals that 59% of IoT
device Privacy policies did not clearly explain to the users
how their information was going to be collected, used and
disclosed, while 68% failed to adequately specify how they
stor the information. In addition, a high percentage (72%)
of IoT devices did not mention how users could edit their
information (delete, update), and ﬁnally only 38% adequately
explain how users could contact the manufacturer if they have
any privacy concerns.
A. Difference between website privacy policy and IoT privacy
policy
There are some important differences between IoT privacy
policies and traditional privacy policies for websites. IoT
privacy has changed the concept of previous website privacy
policy content due to the sensitivity of personal data trans-
ferred from IoT device to the cloud/server and vice versa. On
one hand, the data captured by a wearable device, for instance,
which reveals the pattern of the users’ life, is transferred
from the device to the cloud or server. This information is
much more sensitive than what happens when information is
collected and transferred while a user is browsing, searching,
or even emailing through websites. On the other hand, IoT
devices create the data while they are actively connected to
the internet. With wearable tech and other IoT devices for
example, it is not always necessary to manually connect to
the web, so there is the potential for data capture and transfer
at times when the user is not aware. Thus, manufacturers
need to be thinking about these issues when designing and
implementing privacy policy agreements for their IoT devices.
IV. PROPOSED MODEL
A. Eight criteria for IoT Privacy Policy
This section aims to outline eight key criteria which all IoT
privacy agreements should meet. Our goal is to determine the
following:
1) How many IoT manufacturers have a PPA that is appro-
priate for their IoT products?
2) To what extent do these IoT manufacturers adhere to the
eight criteria outlined in this section?
3) Which criteria are most and least likely to be sufﬁciently
met?
To achieve these objectives, we conduct two separate studies.
The ﬁrst one is an analysis of 11 IoT manufacturers, with
the aim of ﬁnding out if these companies offer appropriate
PPA for their devices. Another aim is to investigate whether
the IoT manufacturers provide sufﬁcient information in their
PPA, such as what kind of personal data they collect from
their IoT device, whether they interact with a third party or
not, etc. The 11 IoT manufacturers that we analyze are the
following:
1- LIFX 2- AWAIR (Bitﬁnder)
3- Google Home 4- Tp-link
5- Samsung smart home 6- Belkin
7- Nest Labs 8- Hive
9- Toymail 10- Philips Lighting
11- Honeywell
The second study focuses on establishing eight criteria
that should be implemented by each IoT manufacturer. To
create these key criteria, we ﬁrst conduct research on the
responsibilities of modern manufacturers, then we propose the
main eight privacy policy criteria for any IoT device in the
form of the following obligations of IoT manufacturers:
1) Explain what kind of personal and non-personal in-
formation the manufacturer will collect from their IoT
device and explain why they need it.
2) Clearly specify to IoT users what speciﬁc information
will be provided by IoT users themselves, once they
create their IoT account.
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3) Explain to IoT users what information will be collected
from them automatically when they perform speciﬁc
action with their IoT devices and why the manufacturer
needs to collect that information.
4) Explain to IoT users how their information will be used
and treated by the IoT manufacturer.
5) The rights of IoT users to control (edit, delete) their data
saved in IoT cloud/servers.
6) Clearly specify to IoT users how long they will store
their personally identiﬁable information (PII) on the IoT
manufacturer’s cloud server.
7) Clearly ask for the IoT user’s consent in order to
collect/share extra information and explain the reason
for this request.
8) Clearly inform the IoT users of the geographical location
of the IoT servers where the manufacturer keeps/stores
the IoT user’s data.
It is important to highlight that these criteria have been
supported by the ICO report [18] based on the following
considerations:
1) The standards set in place by the General Data Protec-
tion Regulation (GDPR) clearly state that any personal
data should be processed in highly secured environment
and guarantee total privacy of personal data, for instance
protecting any type of unauthorized access by using stan-
dard security methods. The GDPR has set the criteria for
manufacturers on what data needs to be collected about
the users through a table created by them. Categories of
personal data represent one such information. This point
covers criteria number 1,2, and 3.
2) The GDPR underlines the importance of telling users
how their data is being used. This point covers criterion
number 4.
3) The GDPR is critical on the fact that users have the
right to remove their personal data at any time with
no restrictions as be totally forgotten. This point covers
criterion number 5.
4) The GDPR states that users have the right to know
the period of keeping their personal data under the
manufacturer’s possession. In addition, they have the
right to withdraw their consent at any time. This point
covers criterion number 6,7.
5) Special restrictions have been imposed by the GDPR
on the transfer of personal data outside the European
Union, to third countries, or to any international orga-
nizations without prior user knowledge and approval,
to ensure that the level of individual protection is not
undermined.This point covers criterion number 8.
B. Analyze the level of compliance of the 11 IoT manufacturer
to the 8 criteria
After our analysis of the PPAs of 11 IoT manufacturers as
mentioned earlier, we manually apply the eight key criteria to
each IoT manufacturer. Then, we identify the respective levels
of adherence of each manufacturer as well as identify which
criteria are most likely to be sufﬁciently met according to this
analysis. Tables 1a and 1b illustrate each individual company’s
compliance (11 IoT manufacturers) to the mentioned 8 require-
ments. We establish the level of compliance by studying the
privacy policy agreement for each IoT manufacturer.
As we can see from Tables 1a and 1b, the most likely
criteria to be fulﬁlled are criteria no 1,2,4 and no 5 with
(82%), in other words, 9 out of 11 IoT companies comply to
these four criteria, while 8 out of 11 IoT companies comply
to only criterion no.3 (73%), followed by criterion 7 which
achieved compliance by 7 out of 11 IoT companies (64%).
Furthermore, only 6 of the IoT companies comply to criterion
no.6 (55%). Finally, there is one criterion which are poorly
explained or consistently overlooked, criterion no 8, this
criterion achieved compliance by only 4 IoT companies (36%).
Figure 1 demonstrates a comparison of levels of compliance
to the 8 IoT privacy criteria among the 11 IoT manufacturers.
Firstly, the graph shows that only one of the eleven IoT
companies (Awair) comply to all eight privacy policy criteria.
While four out of eleven companies (88%) comply to seven
criteria. Secondly, 63% which represent three out of eleven
IoT companies comply only to ﬁve criteria, whereas just two
IoT companies comply to half of the criteria. Finally, it should
be noted that the lowest level of compliance is for one IoT
company(LIFX) which comply to only 2 criteria.
Based on our results, we could argue that the 11 IoT
companies did not achieve full compliance to the 8 criteria.
However, it is crucial for any IoT company to comply to the
list of criteria because it could be considered as a deﬁnitive
breakdown of the things that IoT manufacturers or vendors
must tell users both before and after they activate their IoT
devices. In addition, according to Edith Ramirez statement
[21] , by adhering to this criteria IoT manufacturers will gain
transparency, honesty and trustworthy relationship between
them and their IoT users/consumers which will have a great
impact on the IoT companies’ proﬁts
C. IoT Test Bed Architecture
The purpose of this section is to determine to what extent
IoT manufacturers are adhering to their own PPA presented
in their website. To do this, we need to ﬁnd out precisely
what kind of information is being captured, how it is being
used, and whether these processes are sufﬁciently detailed
in the IoT PPA. This involves ’snifﬁng’ the trafﬁc moving
between the device and the cloud to see what data is being
transferred. Figure 2 illustrates that, in this context, trafﬁc is
transmitted (and therefore needs to be monitored) among three
points: IoT device, IoT application on a smart phone, and the
manufacturer’s cloud infrastructure. For this part of the study,
we used a basic, low cost wireless IP camera from Belkin
called NetCam and a Tp-Link HS110 Wi-Fi Smart Plug. Kali
Linux laptop was conﬁgured for use as a Wi-Fi hot spot [22]
to connect the IoT devices and the Android smart phone to
the Internet through Kali Linux.
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Fig. 1: How many of the 8 privacy criteria does each IoT manufacturer adhere to
IoT company &
Privacy policy
main criteria
LIFX Google Home Samsung
smart home
Nest Labs Toymail
Criteria no.1 X X   
Criteria no.2     
Criteria no.3 X X   
Criteria no.4 X X   
Criteria no.5 X  X  
Criteria no.6 X  X X 
Criteria no.7   X  X
Criteria no.8 X X X  
(a) apply the 8 criteria to the ﬁrst 5 IoT manufacturers
IOT company &
Privacy policy
main criteria
AWAIR TP-link Belkin Hive Philips
Lighting
Honeywell The percentage
of devices that
comply with to
each criterion
Criteria no.1       82%
Criteria no.2    X  X 82%
Criteria no.3      X 73%
Criteria no.4       82%
Criteria no.5       82%
Criteria no.6  X    X 55%
Criteria no.7  X  X   64%
Criteria no.8  X X X X  36%
(b) apply the 8 criteria to the last 6 IoT manufacturers
TABLE I: The level of compliance between 11 IoT manufacturers against 8 criteria.
D. IoT compliance experiments
1) Belkin NetCam: A. Packet analysis using Wireshark:
Using the IoT architecture illustrated in Figure 2, we managed
to sniff the data packets moving between the NetCam and
its cloud named Seedonk , as well as between the NetCam
app and the mentioned cloud. By using wireshark to monitor
the trafﬁcs, we observed SSL/TLS trafﬁc as well as an un-
encrypted trafﬁc. It was clear from wireshark that video ﬁles
aren’t transferred using encrypted methods. After the TCP
handshake, a packet is delivered from the camera to the cloud
and signiﬁcant amounts of data can be inferred from this
packet such as the user name of the device owner, the MAC
address of the IP camera, and the local IP address.
B. Mobile app analysis using Burp suite tool: We use
burp suite tool to intercept the SSL/TLS encrypted trafﬁc
between the NetCam app and the Seedonk cloud using man
in the middle (MITM) attack. We set up burp suite by
following [23]. By accessing the burp suite interface, the
SSL/TLS trafﬁcs were displayed in plain text form. It’s worth
to say that we could not uncover any user credentials via
the NetCam application. Consequently, We attempted to do
so in another way. We navigated to the NetCam website
(https://NetCam.Belkin.com) from the smart phone. So, we did
manage to break the SSL/TLS connection between the smart
phone web browser and between the NetCam web servers, via
use of the burp suite tool ans uncover the credentials in plain
text form.
C. Belkin NetCam Compliance to its PPA:
• As regards information which complies with the NetCam
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Fig. 2: IoT Architecture
PPA:
1) Netcam application does not transmit information
about the exact location of the device. In this case,
we did not give consent for this data to be cap-
tured. This demonstrates a high level of compliance,
because the privacy agreement states that no such
information can be collected without permission
from the user.
2) NetCam appears to transmit only data which has
been expressly permitted and described in the agree-
ment. This includes technical information about
the NetCam device (model, version, H.W, S.W,
ﬁrmware, etc.) and utility settings (resolution, status,
size, mode, notiﬁcations, etc.)
3) We could not capture any information related to
the smart phone such as (O.S, H.W, manufacturer,
model number, etc.). This demonstrates a high level
of compliance, because the privacy agreement states
that no such information can be collected
• As regards information which does not comply with the
NetCam PPA:
1) We discover that the Belkin NetCam uses encryption
technology to protect PII data as it moves between
the application to the cloud (and vice versa). While
this encryption is a good way to ensure that personal
data is secure, there is no proper mention of this
in their PPA. Therefore, the manufacturer needs
to think about providing more details about its
encryption process. If it does not, customers might
feel deceived, and it could reﬂect badly on the IoT
manufacturer and even damage its sales. On the
other hand, most users are aware of the importance
of employing data encryption methods.
2) Even though the NetCam PPA does not include the
name of the cloud server used by them, we are able
to discover this information. Also, attempting to un-
cover the geographical location of the cloud server
we ﬁnd two locations, one server located in Ire-
land/Dublin and the other located in United States/
Virginia, this ﬁnding violates criterion number 8.
According to GDPR the user has the right to know
the geographical area containing the servers/clouds
where their personal data is kept.
3) We found that, although NetCam collects user’s
images and videos and sent them to the cloud
server, there is no clear mention of this process in
the NetCam PPA. This critical ﬁnding violates two
main criteria which are number 1 and number 3.
According to FTC [21] and ICO [18] it is highly
important to inform the users of what kind of
information is being collected about them.
2) Tp-link Smart Plug: A. Packet analysis using Wire-
shark: We attempt to sniff the trafﬁc moving between the
Smart Plug and the android application named kasa which
controls the Smart Plug and between kasa application and
the cloud (refer to Figure 2). After observing the wireshark
network trafﬁc, we detect encrypted trafﬁc during the inter-
action between kasa application and the smart plug. Next,
we successfully decompile (reverse engineer) kasa application
and ﬁnd the encryption function that is used to encrypt the
trafﬁc between kasa application and the Smart Plug server.
We use this encryption ﬁle to apply wireshark dissector in
LUA code. By plugging in the new LUA ﬁle, the trafﬁc will
automatically decrypt [24]. As a result, we are able to monitor
the communications between kasa application and the Smart
Plug on their local WiFi in a plain text
B. Mobile app analysis using Burp suite tool: In order
to intercept the SSL/TLS trafﬁc between kasa application and
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the cloud via the burp suite tool, we follow the same steps
described in Section 5.4.1(B). We ﬁnd that when we launched
kasa application at ﬁrst time a log-in method is triggered
and therefore sends user’s credentials to the cloud. However,
every time we open the application to perform any action
(switch Plug on/off, schedule an event, etc), the helloIoTCloud
method triggers and again sends user’s credentials to the cloud.
Lastly, we uncover eight main methods of requesting/sending
personal data to/from the TP-Link cloud which are: login
method, helloIoTCloud method, list scenes method, isLinked
method, retrieve location method, list Rules method, pass
through method, and get device list method. The following
types of information are transferred using these methods:
1) Application such as: appName, appType, appVersion
2) Client such as: clientId, geolocation, locale time-
zoneId, mobileType, userDevice manufacturer, userDe-
vice model, device osVersion, ownerEmail
3) Smart Plug information such as: sw ver, hw ver, type,
model, mac address, hwId, dev name, alias, location,
fwVer, deviceName, status, deviceType, appServerUrl,
deviceModel, deviceMac, isSameRegion
C. Smart Plug Compliance to its PPA:
• As regards information which comply with the Smart
Plug PPA:
The information collected from the Smart Plug and the
Kasa application mentioned earlier appears to be in full
compliance with the PPA as they mentioned in detail what
type of information the smart plug will collect.
• As regards information which does not comply with the
Smart Plug PPA.
1) As with the NetCam, it was discovered that the
Smart Plug does utilize encryption technologies,
even though there is no mention of this in the PPA.
2) There was no information provided about the name
of their cloud server, but we could ﬁnd out that
the manufacturer uses a TPLinkra cloud server.
In addition, we could determine the geographical
location of the cloud servers which was located at
United States/Virginia, this ﬁnding violates criterion
number 8. According to GDPR the user has the
right to know the geographical area containing the
servers/clouds where their personal data is kept.
To conclude this section, our ﬁndings prove that there is
critical violation in terms of the IoT companies’ levels of
compliance with their privacy policy agreement. We ﬁnd that
the actual data we obtained from capturing Belkin NetCam and
Tp-link smart plug trafﬁc did not comply with what they stated
in their PPA. Interestingly, we conclude that Belkin NetCam
shows a quite high level of compliance with our 8 criteria
(88%) see ﬁgure 1 whereas from our experiment we prove
that the level of compliance of Belkin NetCam with what they
stated in their privacy policy is low as they violate 3 statements
with in their PPA which are similar to criteria (no.1, no.3, and
no.8). In contrast, we ﬁnd that the Tp-link smart plug shows
a quite high level of compliance to what they stated in their
privacy policy as they only did not comply to one statement
which is similar to criterion no. 8 whereas it shows only 63%
of compliance to the 8 criteria see ﬁgure 1.
Unless IoT companies issue an appropriate PPA that comply
to the 8 privacy policy criteria and, more importantly, comply
to what they state in their own PPA, user’s privacy issues will
always be compromised.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we discuss the importance of having a separate
PPA for IoT devices as it differ from website PPA and
we implement IoT privacy compliance test bed. The main
objective is to determine the level of compliance of IoT
manufacturers with their respective PPA. We posit eight key
criteria and compare them with the actual PPA carried out by
each IoT device.
First, we investigate the PPAs of 11 IoT devices. Then we
manually compare their respective PPA with the 8 privacy
criteria. The results show that only one criterion out of the
eight criteria have been fulﬁlled by eleven IoT manufacturers,
while only four out of eleven IoT manufacturers only comply
with 88% of the eight criteria. The next step is to construct
and execute a test-bed procedure for two selected IoT devices;
the Belkin NetCam and the Tp-Link Smart Plug.
We sniff the data packets being moved between the IoT
device and the cloud, between the IoT device and the smart
phone, and between the smart phone and the cloud. Surpris-
ingly, we ﬁnd that the Smart Plug adheres to 63% of the
established 8 criteria, but as for the terms of their PPA, they
show a high level of compliance because they only did not
comply to one statement which is similar to criterion (no.8)
of the promises contained in its own PPA. Similarly, although
we ﬁnd that the NetCam show a quit high level of adheres to
88% of the established 8 criteria, they failed to adhere to their
own PPA because they violate 3 statements which are similar
to criteria(no.1,no.3 and no.8).
Yet, it could still be argued that the percentages of the
adherence to the 8 criteria are not high enough, particularly
in the case of adherence to key data privacy targets. There
is a clear need for manufacturers to continue evolving and
developing their PPA by either changing the behavior of the
device to comply with their PPA, or by modifying the PPA to
reﬂect the actual behavior of the IoT device.
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